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INTRODUCTION
Proposals to regulate campaign contributions and candidates' spending
invariably fly the banner of campaign finance "reform." The reformers,
however, frequently have little or no evidence that particular campaign
practices cause any real harm. Instead, they simply posit the existence of the
disease-the corrosive effects of money on the political process-and assume
* Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B., Princeton University, 1969; J.D., Columbia
University, 1973. The author was co-counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern
Missouri ("ACLU/EM") in two of the three principal cases discussed below. See infra note 36 and
accompanying text.
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that restrictions on the use of money will provide the cure. In Missouri, for
example, both the legislature and the voters enacted laws in 1994 that set
limits on political contributions to candidates and on candidates' campaign
expenditures. These laws imposed substantial burdens on political speech
and association, but they did little more than pander to public perceptions
about the amorphous evils of "big money." The legislature and the voters had
no evidence that contributions or expenditures in the prohibited amounts
caused any identified harm, and any cure for problems in the State's elections
was entirely serendipitous. The frank comment of a Missouri legislator that
"[p]erception is more important than what's real" captures the substance of
many measures that masquerade as campaign finance "reform."'
The Supreme Court, unfortunately, left the door open in Buckley v. Valeo2
to campaign finance reform measures, like the 1994 Missouri laws, that are
grounded on little more than speculation and the cynical assumption that
money necessarily and inherently corrupts the political process. Although the
Buckley Court held that campaign finance measures are subject to strict
scrutiny, it accepted speculation about corruption and the appearance of
corruption as a justification for regulating campaign contributions.3 Lawyers
for the American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri ("ACLU/EM")
discovered a means to close the door left open in Buckley and to provide
greater First Amendment protection for political speech. They persuaded the
courts in the Eighth Circuit to supplement Buckley and to impose a duty on
the State to demonstrate that campaign finance regulations address a "real
harm."4 Although the Supreme Court did not review these judgments, it
endorsed the Eighth Circuit's new, more demanding First Amendment
standard for campaign finance laws.5
I. THE 1994 MISSOURI CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM LEGISLATION
In 1994, Missouri limited candidates' total campaign expenditures; it
prohibited candidates from carrying over more than $1000, $2000, or $3000
of campaign funds from one election to another; and it prohibited candidates
1. Missouri State Senator Jim Mathewson, testifying before a state legislative committee,
supported campaign contribution limits because the perception of the voters who had overwhelmingly
favored such limits in an initiative was more important than the reality that the limits were "silly." See
Virginia Young, Campaign Money Limits Look Good, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 10, 1997, at
4B.
2. 424U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
3. See infra text at notes 41-55.
4. See infra text at notes 69-137.
5. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 116 S. Ct.
2309 (1996) (discussed infra at notes 153-58 and accompanying text).
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from spending more than $100, $200, or $300 of their personal resources to
run for state and local office. Missouri also restricted campaign contributions.
The State limited contributions to candidates for state and local office on a
sliding scale from $300 to $200 to $100 per election cycle, and it prohibited
elected officials holding certain offices, as well as candidates for these
offices, from accepting contributions during regular sessions of the state
legislature.
These campaign finance regulations were the product of two sets of
amendments to Missouri's Campaign Finance Disclosure Law.6 In July 1994,
the Missouri legislature enacted Senate Bill 650 and limited campaign
contributions and expenditures.7 On November 8, 1994, the Missouri
electorate approved Proposition A, a ballot initiative that also established
campaign finance regulations.8 The Missouri Attorney General ruled that
Proposition A, which was to become effective immediately, superseded
Senate Bill 650 to the extent that its provisions were more restrictive and
that, otherwise, Senate Bill 650 would become effective on January 1, 1995.9
A. Limits on Candidates 'Political Expenditures
Senate Bill 650 limited the total amount that candidates could spend to
run for state and local office.10 Candidates had a duty to file an affidavit
indicating whether they intended to comply with expenditure limits that
ranged from $30,000 to $1,500,000. The legislature imposed two penalties
on candidates who rejected these limits. First, they could accept contributions
only from individuals, but opposing candidates-who agreed to abide by the
expenditure limits-could accept contributions from political parties, political
action committees, corporations, and labor unions, as well as from
individuals. 12 Second, candidates who rejected the spending limits had a duty
to file daily reports of contributions and expenditures with the Missouri
Ethics Commission after their expenditures exceeded the prescribed limit,
but candidates who accepted the expenditure limits had no duty to file daily
reports.1 3 Candidates who rejected the spending limits were subject to
6. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.011 etseq. (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
7. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 634-35 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579
(1996); Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422, 1423 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2579 (1996).
8. Id.
9. See 94 Op. Mo. Att'y Gen 218 (Dec. 6, 1994), 1994 MO. AG LExiS 24.
10. See MO. REv. STAT. § 130.052(1996).
11. See a § 130.052.8(1996).
12. See id § 130.052.3 (1996).
13. Seeiid
1998]
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criminal sanctions for accepting contributions from sources other than
individuals, and for failing to file daily disclosure reports. 14
In addition to Senate Bill 650's limits on candidates' total campaign
expenditures, Proposition A established two other spending limits.
Proposition A prohibited candidates for various elective offices in Missouri
from spending more than $100, $200, or $300 of their own funds to support
their campaigns. I5 Proposition A also regulated the timing of campaign
expenditures and restricted the amount of campaign funds that could be spent
in subsequent elections. It provided that every candidate, within ninety days
of an election, "shall" either turn over to Missouri Ethics Commission or
return to the contributors "any balance of campaign funds in excess of
expenses incurred for the campaign, except for an amount no greater than ten
times the individual contribution limit" applicable to that office. 16 Given
individual contribution limits of $100, $200, or $300,17 candidates could not
retain more than $1000, $2000, or $3000 of the funds raised in one campaign
and could not carry these funds over for use in a subsequent campaign to
express their political views.1
8
B. Campaign Contribution Limits
Senate Bill 650 limited campaign contributions to candidates for office in
Missouri on a sliding scale ranging from $1000 to $500 to $250.19 It
14. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.081 (West 1997).
15. Proposition A limited "contributions" to candidates for office in Missouri on a sliding scale
from $100 to $200 to $300 per election cycle (see infra text at notes 25-27), and it had the effect of
limiting candidates' personal expenditures because the term "contribution" was defined to included
"[a] candidate's own money or property used in support of the person's candidacy ... " Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 130.011(12)(a) (West Supp. 1998). As a result, with the exception of expenses for "food,
lodging, travel, and payment of any fee necessary to the filing for public office," candidates for state
and local office in Missouri could not spend more than the prescribed amounts of their own funds in
their efforts to be elected. Id.
Senate Bill 650 also established contribution limits. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.032 (1996); see
infra text at notes 19-23. These limits, however, were superseded by the more restrictive contribution
limits of Proposition A. After the Proposition A contribution limits were held unconstitutional (see
infra text at notes 102-23), the contribution limits set by Senate Bill 650 took effect and limited
contributions by candidates to their own campaigns. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 130.011(12)(a),
130.032.1 (West Supp. 1998). The Missouri legislature amended Senate Bill 650's contribution limits
in 1997 to remove the limits on the amounts that candidates could contribute to their own campaigns.
See S.B. 16, 89th Gen. Ass., § A; see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032.1 (West Supp. 1998) (contribution
limits apply to "any person other than the candidate").
16. Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.130 (1996).
17. Seeid § 130.100(1996).
18. Senate Bill 650 also limited candidates' expenditure of carryover campaign funds. See Mo. REV.
STAT. § 130.038 (1996). This provision, which was initially superseded by the more restrictive provision of
Proposition A, was repealed in 1997. See S.B. 16,89th Gen. Ass., § A.
19. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032.1 (West Supp. 1998).
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permitted contributions of up to $1000 for governor and other statewide
offices, as well as for candidates in districts with a population of at least
250,000;20 it permitted $500 contributions for candidates for state senate and
candidates for any office in electoral districts with a population between
100,000 and 250,000;2' and it permitted contributions of $250 for candidates
for state representative or for offices in districts with a population of under
100,000.22 Senate Bill 650 provided that these contribution limits "shall be
increased" to take inflation into account.23
Although the contribution limits of Senate Bill 650 were set to go into
effect on January 1, 1995, they were superseded under a ruling of the
Missouri Attorney General by the more restrictive contribution limits of
Proposition A.24 Proposition A limited campaign contributions to candidates
for office in Missouri on a sliding scale ranging from $300 to $200 to $100
per election cycle,25 and it drastically reduced the contribution limits set by
Senate Bill 650 in two ways. First, it reduced the dollar amount of
permissible contributions by as much as seventy percent. It reduced the
contribution limit for governor and other statewide offices from $1000 to
$300; it reduced the contribution limit for districts with a population over
100,000 from $500 to $200; and it reduced the limit for districts under
100,000 from $250 to $100.26 Second, Senate Bill 650 permitted
contributions up to its limits in both primary and general elections, but
Proposition A established a single cumulative limit on all contributions made
in a primary election and the succeeding general election.27 Thus, for
example, under Proposition A, a contributor could have given a gubernatorial
candidate only $300 over the primary and general election combined. Under
Senate Bill 650, however, the contributor could have given a gubernatorial
20. Seei. § 130.032.1(1),(6) (West Supp. 1998).
21. See id § 130.032.1(2), (5) (West Supp. 1998).
22. See id. § 130.032.1(3), (4) (West Supp. 1998).
23. See id § 130.032.2 (West Supp. 1998).
24. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. After Proposition A's contribution limits were held
unconstitutional (see infra text at notes 102-23), Senate Bill 650's contribution limits, which had been
superseded under the ruling of the Missouri Attorney General, took effect See MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 130.032.1 (West Supp. 1998).
25. SeeMO.REV. STAT. § 130.100(1996).
26. The categories for different contribution limits in Proposition A and Senate Bill 650 were not
identical. Senate Bill 650 permitted a higher level of contribution ($1000) for candidates in districts over
250,000; Proposition A subjected candidates in all districts over 100,000 to a $200 limit. Compare Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 130.032.1 (1), (6) (West Supp. 1998), with Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.100 (1996).
27. Proposition A limited contributions "per election cycle," and Senate Bill 650 limited contributions
"in any one election." Compare Mo. REv. STAT. § 130.100 (1996), with Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 130.032,
130.032.4 (West Supp. 1998); see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.011(15) (West Supp. 1998) (definition of
"election"); id. § 130.011(16) (West 1997) (definition of"election cycle") (the 1997 amendment deleted the
definition of"election cycle"). See generally Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.011 (West Supp. 1998).
19981
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
candidate $1000 in the primary election and an additional $1000 in the
general election, for a combined total of $2000.
C. Limits on Contributions During Legislative Sessions
Although both Senate Bill 650 and Proposition A set contribution limits,
Proposition A did not regulate the timing of political contributions. Senate
Bill 650, however, prohibited "statewide elected official[s]" and members of
the general assembly, and candidates for these offices, from accepting
campaign contributions "during any regular session of the general
assembly."28
H. BEYOND BUCKLEY-ESTABLISHING A NEW, MORE RIGOROUS FIRST
AMENDmENT STANDARD FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
Prospective candidates and potential contributors successfully challenged
the 1994 amendments in three cases. In Shrink Missouri Government PAC v.
Maupin (Shrink 1),29 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
Missouri limits on candidates' political expenditures were unconstitutional. 0
In Carver v. Nixon,31 a district court upheld the $100 to $300 contribution
limits,32 but the court of appeals held that these limits on political speech
violated the First Amendment.33 Finally, in Shrink Missouri Government
PAC v. Maupin (Shrink 10,34 a district court held that the prohibition on
campaign contributions during legislative sessions violated the First
Amendment 3 5 The ACLU/EM represented the plaintiffs in Shrink I, and it
supported the plaintiff in Carver with an amicus brief in the court of
appeals.36
All three cases in large part called for a relatively straightforward
28. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032(4) (Vest 1997). After a district court held that this provision
violated the First Amendment (see infra text at notes 124-37), the Missouri legislature repealed it. See
S.B. 16, 89th Gen. Ass., § A; see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032 (West Supp. 1998).
29. 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo.), affid, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2579 (1996).
30. See id. at 1429.
31. 882 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mo.), rev'd, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2579 (1996).
32. See Carver, 882 F. Supp. at 906.
33. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 645 (8th Cir. 1995).
34. 922 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
35. See id. at 1425.
36. The author of this Article and Frank Susman were co-counsel for the ACLU/EM, and Denise
Field worked extensively on both cases. This Article states the opinions and analysis ofthe author, and
it does not purport to present the views of Mr. Susman, Ms. Field, the ACLU/EM, or the national
ACLU.
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application of the First Amendment standards established in 1976 by the
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.Y Nonetheless, the ACLU/EM persuaded
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to impose a new, more rigorous
First Amendment standard on the states' power to regulate political
expenditures and contributions.38 The court of appeals supplemented
Buckley's strict scrutiny standard with a requirement that the state "must do
more than simply 'posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured."' 39
The state "must demonstrate that the recited harms are real,.., and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.' '4
A. The Buckley Framework-Limited Protection of Political Speech
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court set the First Amendment measure
of campaign finance regulation. Although the Court applied strict scrutiny to
both expenditure limits and contribution limits, it drew a fundamental
distinction between governmental power to regulate political expenditures
and governmental power to regulate political contributions.41 The Court held
that (1) limits on independent expenditures made by individuals or groups to
oppose or advocate the election of candidates, (2) limits on candidates'
expenditures from personal and family funds, and (3) limits on candidates'
overall campaign expenditures violate the First Amendment, but it upheld
restrictions on political contributions as a means of preventing corruption or
the appearance of corruption.42 The Court did not require any showing that
the prohibited contributions caused any harm, and it recognized, in effect,
substantial government power to regulate political contributions and to limit
political speech and association.
The Supreme Court held that campaign expenditure limits are subject to
strict scrutiny because they burden fundamental First Amendment rights of
political association and political expression. 43 A limit on campaign spending
"necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
37. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
38. See Carver, 72 F.3d at 638.
39. Id (quoting United States v. National Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU"), 513 U.S. 454, 475
(1995), quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)).
40. Id. (quoting NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added)).
41. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-23 ("expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe
restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than ... limitations on financial
contributions').
42. Compare id. at 23-38 with id. at 39-59.
43. See id. at 14-23, 39-59.
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
reached." 44 Spending limits impose "substantial... restraints on the quantity
and diversity of political speech" because "virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of
money."45 Given these burdens, the Court held that limits on overall
campaign expenditures by federal candidates46 and limits on candidates'
personal expenditures47 violate the First Amendment. The Court also held
that limits on independent expenditures made by individuals or groups to
oppose or advocate the election of candidates violate the First Amendment. 8
Although the Court also applied strict scrutiny to campaign contribution
limits, 49 it upheld the Federal Election Campaign Act's $1000 limit on
contributions to federal candidates.s The Court held that this $1000 limit on
campaign contributions served the government's compelling interest in
"limit[ing] the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large
individual financial contributions" and that it "focuse[d] precisely on the
problem of large campaign contributions-the narrow aspect of political
association where the actuality and potential for corruption have been
44. Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 54-59. The Court found that there was "[n]o governmental interest ... sufficient to
justify the restriction on the quantity of political expression" imposed by campaign expenditure limits, and
it specifically rejected the arguments that any interest "in equalizing the financial resources of candidates"
or "in reducing the allegedly skyrocketing costs of political campaigns" could justify limits on candidates'
campaign spending. Ia at 55-57.
Although the Court upheld a public financing scheme for presidential elections that included an
expenditure limit, it expressly noted that this expenditure limit was valid only because it was tied
directly to an offer of public financing. See id. at 57 n.65, 90-109.
47. See id at 51-54. The Court held that a "ceiling on personal expenditures by candidates on
their own behalf' interferes with the candidate's "right to engage in the discussion of public issues and
vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election." Id. at 52. This restraint could not be justified
as an attempt to curb the corruption or appearance of corruption of political candidates. See id. at 53.
In fact, "the use of personal funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside contributions and
thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to which . . . contribution
limitations are directed." Id. (footnote omitted).
48. See id. at 39-51. Although the Court subsequently upheld one very narrowly tailored restriction
on independent expenditures by corporations in support of candidates, it has never wavered from the
fundamental proposition that limits on candidates' campaign spending violate the First Amendment.
CompareAustin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,655-61 (1990), with Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 39-57.
49. Campaign contribution limits are subject to strict scrutiny because they burden fundamental
First Amendment rights of political association and political expression. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-
29; accord Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298 (1981) ("Contributions by
individuals... [are] beyond question a very significant form of political expression... [and] regulation of
First Amendment rights is always subject to exacting judicial scrutiny.').
50. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-29. The Court also upheld a $5000 limit on contributions by political
committees to candidates and a $25,000 limit on total contributions by an individual during any calendar
year. See id. at 35-36, 38.
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identified."51 Congress, however, had not in fact identified any particular
level of political contributions, much less contributions in excess of $1000,
that caused corruption or the appearance of corruption.
Congress, at most, had some basis for concern about problems created by
"large" contributions in unspecified amounts. Congress set the $1000 limit in
response to reports that in the 1972 national elections "large contributions"
had been "given to secure a political quidpro quo from current and potential
office holders" and in response to "the appearance of corruption stemming
from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of
large individual financial contributions. 52 Congress did not have any
evidence that contributions in excess of $1000 were large enough either to
corrupt the recipients or to create the appearance of corruption.
The Court, nonetheless, did not look for any evidence in the legislative
record to support the specific $1000 limit, and it did not require the
government to develop any after-the-fact evidence to justify the legislature's
decision. Indeed, the Court disclaimed any concern whether the $1000 limit
was "unrealistically low because much more than that amount would still not
be enough to enable an unscrupulous contributor to exercise improper
influence ... , It was enough that Congress thought that some limit on
political contributions was necessary; there would be no judicial "fine
tuning" of legislative choices between a $1000 limit and a $2000 limit5 4 In
short, the Court permitted Congress to limit political contributions without
any evidence that contributions in any particular amounts in excess of $1000
caused the harms, corruption, or the appearance of corruption, that inspired
the restriction.
55
51. Id at 26, 28 (emphasis added). The Court found that there was no connection between the
compelling interest in avoiding corruption and limits on candidates' campaign expenditures. See id. at 55
('The interest in alleviating the corrupting influence of large contributions is served by... contribution
limitations and disclosure provisions rather than by... campaign expenditure ceilings.'). In Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court did recognize a connection between limits on independent
expenditures by corporations in support of candidates and corruption. 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). The Austin
Court, however, did not question the understanding in Buckley that limits on candidates' expenditures are
not related to the government's interest in avoiding corruption.
52. Buckle,, 424 U.S. at 26-27. The Supreme Court did not discuss any evidence that
contributions of any particular amount had been given to secure a political quid pro quo. It simply
noted that "the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that the
problem is not an illusory one," and cited two pages and three footnotes in the court of appeals'
opinion that "discussed a number of the abuses uncovered after the 1972 elections." Id. at 27 & n.28.
The court of appeals identified the amount of only one contribution, a $2,000,000 contribution from
the dairy industry to President Richard M. Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign. See Buckley v. Valeo,
519 F.2d 821, 839-40 & nn.36-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
53. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.
54. See id. at 30.
55. Although the Buckley Court did not address the empirical question whether contributions
1998]
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B. First Amendment Supplement To Buckley
The Buckley Court applied strict scrutiny to campaign finance regulation,
but it also accepted speculation about actual corruption or the appearance of
corruption as a justification for limiting political speech and association. The
Court endorsed Congress' power to prohibit contributions in "large" but
unspecified amounts, and then upheld a $1000 contribution limit without any
evidence that contributions in excess of $1000 caused the problem or
appearance of corruption. This judgment created a risk that speculation about
campaign finance problems might be sufficient to justify other restrictions on
political speech and association.56 Indeed, the Missouri limits on political
expenditures and contributions, adopted in 1994 by the legislature in Senate
Bill 650 and by the electorate in Proposition A, were based on just such
speculation and conjecture about problems in the electoral process.
Fortunately, however, a significant evolution of First Amendment law
provided a means to close the door left open in Buckley and to protect
political speech. In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union
("NTEU'), 7 the Supreme Court imposed a heavy burden on government to
justify regulation of federal employees' nonpolitical speech and writing. The
government must offer more "than mere speculation about serious harms."58
It must demonstrate that "the recited harms are real .. . and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way."
59
The challenges to the 1994 Missouri statutes created an opportunity to
transfer this First Amendment requirement to campaign finance regulation
and to force government to justify regulation of political speech, not on the
over $1000 caused any identifiable harm, it did consider evidence of the actual effect of this
contribution limit on political speech. The Court recognized that "[g]iven the important role of
contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on
political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the
resources necessary for effective advocacy." Id. at 21. There was, however, "no indication" that the
$1000 limit would have "any dramatic adverse effect" because only 5.1% of all contributions to
congressional candidates in 1974 had been made in contributions exceeding $1000. Id. at 21 & n.2 3 ,
26 n.27. Moreover, it seemed likely that "some or all" of those funds "could have been replaced
through efforts to raise additional contributions from persons giving less than $1000." Id. at 26 n.27. In
addition to considering the actual effect of the $1000 contribution limit on candidates' ability to
communicate their views, the Court also considered the effect of this contribution limit on incumbents
and challengers. The record, however, did not provide any basis for concluding that the $1000 limit
favored incumbents over major-party, minor-party, or independent challengers. See id. at 30-35.
56. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1981) (Buckley
authorizes limits on political activity to address the "perception of undue influence of large
contributors to a candidate").
57. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
58. Id. at 475.
59. Id (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)).
[VOL. 76:217226
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basis of public perceptions and fears, but instead on the basis of actual, real
world, harms.
60
1. National Treasury Employees Union: Duty To "Demonstrate That
The Recited Harms Are Real"
The Supreme Court held in NTEU that a prohibition against federal
employees accepting honoraria for making appearances, giving speeches, or
writing articles violated the First Amendment. The government's interest
"that federal officers not misuse or appear to misuse power by accepting
compensation for their unofficial and nonpolitical writing and speaking
activities" was "undeniably powerful." 61 Nonetheless, regulation of federal
employees' speech required some evidence that accepting honoraria caused
the harm that the government postulated:
[w]hen the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means to
redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than
simply "posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured."... It
must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in
a direct and material way.62
Although the government posited the disease (misuse of power), it could
not demonstrate that the acceptance of honoraria by low-level federal
employees caused any real harm. The government had "no evidence of
misconduct related to honoraria in the vast rank and file of [low-level]
federal employees," and it had only "limited evidence of actual or apparent
impropriety by legislators and high-level executives. 63 Accordingly, the
Court held that Congress could not prohibit lower ranking federal employees
from accepting honoraria. 64
As Justice O'Connor noted, Congress did not have any evidence that the
acceptance of honoraria by low-level federal employees was a problem.
There was no showing "that Congress considered empirical or anecdotal data
60. The Court had suggested in one post-Buckley decision that mere speculation about harms
would not be sufficient to justify a $1000 limit on a political action committee's independent
expenditures in support of a presidential candidate. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) ("On this record, ... an exchange of
political favors for uncoordinated expenditures remains a hypothetical possibility and nothing more.").
61. NTEU,513U.S.at472.
62. Id. at 475 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 664).
63. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 472.
64. See id. at 476-78.
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pertaining to abuses by lower-echelon executive employees. '65 The
government did not have any other evidence of harm. The government's
lawyers cited an official 1992 report, made three years after the ban on
honoraria was imposed, but the Court found that "[ilts 112 pages contain not
one mention of any real or apparent impropriety related to a lower level
employee. ' 66 The Court refused to defer to the government's speculation
about the problems caused by low-level federal employees accepting
honoraria.67 It insisted that even burdens on nonpolitical expression require
"a justification far stronger than mere speculation about serious harms." 68
2. "Real Harm" As A Prerequisite For Campaign Finance Regulation
The ACLU/EM lawyers concluded that NTEU could be used to establish
a new First Amendment requirement for regulation of political expenditures
and contributions: the State must demonstrate that campaign finance
regulations address real harms. If the State could not demonstrate that its
regulations addressed real harms, then there was no warrant for any
restriction on political speech or association. If, however, the State
demonstrated that its regulations addressed real harms, then the court should
apply Buckley's strict scrutiny test.69 The State must show that it has a
compelling interest in rectifying these real harms; that its regulations are
"narrowly tailored;" and that it has considered alternative means of
regulation that would impose fewer burdens on First Amendment interests.
In short, the State "must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms
in a direct and material way.' 70
We argued in Shrink I and in Carver that the State must demonstrate that
the legislature had considered carefully evidence of real problems and that it
had "substantial evidence" of those problems. The State could not satisfy
65. Id at 485 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see id. at 483
(Congress relied on reports that did not note "any problems, anecdotal or otherwise, stemming from the
receipt of honoraria by rank-and-file Executive Branch employees.")
66. Id.at472n.18.
67. See id. at 467 n.1 1 ("The honoraria ban... deters an enormous quantity of speech before it is
uttered, based only on speculation that the speech might threaten the Government's interests.").
68. Id. at 475; see id. at 475-76 n.21 ("Deferring to the Government's speculation about the
pernicious effects of thousands of articles and speeches yet to be written or delivered would encroach
unacceptably on the First Amendment's protections.").
69. Courts in the Eighth Circuit had recognized that, under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam), and its progeny, regulations of political speech must be "narrowly tailored" to serve a
"compelling" state interest. See e.g., Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1361 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 936 (1995).
70. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added).
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NTEU's evidentiary requirement with after-the-fact rationalizations advanced
by its counsel at trial. Justice O'Connor had examined the evidence before
Congress to determine in NTEU whether the acceptance of honoraria by low-
level federal employees caused the harm of misuse of power that the
government recited.7' Similarly, when Justice Kennedy originally stated the
test adopted in NTEU, he turned to the evidence of real harms considered by
the legislature.72 Justice Kennedy recognized that courts must accord
substantial deference to the legislature's predictive judgments and findings.
Nonetheless, courts must also "exercise independent judgment when First
Amendment rights are implicated," and they must determine that the
legislature "has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence."
' 3
We also argued that the State must meet this evidentiary burden for
measures like Proposition A, enacted directly by the voters, as well as for
measures, like Senate Bill 650, enacted by the legislature. It is well-settled
that "voters may no more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot
measure than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation."74
Therefore, the State must demonstrate that the electorate, like the legislature,
had considered carefully evidence of real harms. The fact that a super-
majority of the voters had adopted Proposition A did not in itself satisfy this
evidentiary burden.75 A law enacted by popular vote may in fact be more
suspect than a law enacted by the legislature. The electorate does not have
the benefit of public hearings and legislative deliberations to analyze
proposals. Moreover, voters, unlike legislators, do not take an oath to uphold
the Constitution.76
We were confident that Missouri could not meet its burden of
demonstrating "real harm" under NTEU; the problems in the financing of
state and local elections in Missouri were, at best, speculative. The state
71. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
72. The NTEU test quoted directly Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Turner Broad Sys., Ina
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994). See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
73. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 666 (Kennedy, J. plurality opinion).
74. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); see U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding unconstitutional congressional term limits adopted
directly by state voters).
75. Seventy-four percent of the voters in the November 1994 elections approved Proposition A.
See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 640 (8th Cir. 1995). There were many reasons for voter approval of
Proposition A, some of which, like a desire to level the playing field, are themselves unconstitutional,
and others, like controlling spiraling campaign costs, that are not sufficiently compelling to justify
restrictions on political speech. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49, 54, 56, 57 (1976) (per
curiam). Thus, the mere fact that a majority of the electorate adopted Proposition A could not satisfy
the State's duty to show that it had a compelling interest.
76. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3; Mo CoNST. art. III, § 15.
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legislature and electorate had not considered any evidence of specific
problems. Indeed, neither Senate Bill 650 nor Proposition A even "recited"
any particular harms allegedly to be redressed by their provisions." Even if
courts were willing to consider after-the-fact rationalizations, it seemed
unlikely that counsel would be able to fill the evidentiary void at trial. It
would not be sufficient for the State to submit books of election data from
which a court or others might hypothesize "problems" in the Missouri
electoral process. 78 It would not be sufficient for the State to recite a brief
summary of recent so-called "campaign reform" efforts and to make vague
assertions of popular dissatisfaction with Missouri politics. 79 It would not be
sufficient for the State's counsel to assert broadly and without any factual
support that "such large sums of money are now being spent on Missouri
campaigns that the vast majority of Missouri citizens have seen the need to
take affirmative steps to refocus those campaigns away from money and
toward the kind of grass-roots campaigning that is more likely to make the
process open, fair, and informative." 80 The State's interests were entirely
hypothetical because there was no evidence, much less any substantial
evidence, of any real harms in the Missouri electoral process.
C. Adoption Of The "'Real Harm " Standard In The Eighth Circuit
The ACLU/EM made two efforts to supplement Buckley's First
Amendment standards. In Shrink I, we argued that some evidence of a "real
harm" was a prerequisite for regulation of candidates' political
expenditures. 8' Although the district court gave cautious consideration to this
argument, both the district court and the court of appeals ultimately held that
Missouri's spending limits, under a direct application of Buckley, were
77. Senate Bill 650 did not include any statement of legislative findings. Similarly, Proposition A
did not include a preamble identifying and describing the problems that the various provisions of this
initiative were intended to address, and it offered no explanation how the various regulations were
tailored to accomplish these objectives.
78. In Shrink I, Missouri filed a stack of election reports with their reply brief. See Memorandum
and Order at 2, Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995)
(No. 4:CV815 CDP). The district court ultimately concluded that this raw data did "nothing to prove
or disprove either defendants' or plaintiffs' case." Shrink 1, 892 F. Supp. at 1250.
79. See Memorandum In Support of Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment at 2-3, 4-5,
Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (No. 4:95CV815
CDP).
80. Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). Although counsel intoned this hypothetical state interest in lofty
terms, the Supreme Court had previously held that any interest "in reducing the allegedly skyrocketing
costs of political campaigns" could not justify limits on candidates' campaign spending. Buckley, 424
U.S. at 57.
81. See Shrinkl, 892 F. Supp. at 1249.
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invalid. 2 Our second effort, however, was successful. Appearing as an
amicus in Carver, we argued again that the State had a duty under NTEU to
demonstrate that campaign contribution regulations addressed a "real
harm. ' 3 The court of appeals adopted the NTEU test, and it found no
evidence that contributions to candidates in excess of the prohibited amounts
caused any harm.84 Although Missouri protested that the Eighth Circuit had
established a new First Amendment hurdle for campaign finance regulation,
the Supreme Court denied review.85 In Shrink I1, a district court gave full
effect to the Eighth Circuit's new First Amendment standard for regulation of
political speech. 6 It held that Missouri's limits on campaign contributions
during legislative sessions violated the First Amendment because the State
had no evidence that such contributions caused any real harm.
87
1. Shrink I-Cautious Consideration
In its first case, Shrink I, the ACLU/EM argued that the 1994 Missouri
spending limits violated the First Amendment because the State had no
evidence that any specific amount of candidates' total campaign
expenditures, of candidates' personal expenditures, or of candidates'
expenditure of carryover funds caused any "real harm." The district court
expressly noted our argument that under NTEU the State must "demonstrate
that the recited harms are real."8 The district court did not, however, require
the State to make any showing that the legislature or the electorate had any
evidence of harm. It did not even require the State to make any after-the-fact
showing that the prohibited political expenditures caused any real harm.
Although we argued "that the state must prove that the legislature and the
electorate explicitly considered the specific wrongs now claimed to be
remedied by the statutes,'4 9 the district court refused to require "specific,
historical factual proof."9  In fact, the district court considered certain
82. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
83. See Brief of The American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 7, Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-2608).
84. See Carver, 72 F.3d at 638, 644.
85. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
86. See Shrink11, 922 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
87. See id. at 1420-24, 1425.
88. Shrink 1, 892 F. Supp. 1246, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (quoting NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 475
(1995), citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)).
89. Shrink, 892 F. Supp. at 1250.
90. Id. The district court rejected any contention that the "wrongs" to be remedied must by
identified "by including 'findings' in the laws themselves or by, for example, presenting evidence of
legislative history or testimony about the intent of the electorate or of the legislature. . ." Id. Missouri,
and other states "where the legislature does not collect or preserve legislative history, could never meet
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election reports attached as exhibits to the one of the State's briefs even
though there was "no evidence provided that the legislature or the electorate
actually considered or even had available" these reports.91 The election
reports, however, did "nothing to prove or disprove either defendants' or
plaintiffs' case.",92 Thus, the State, notwithstanding its reliance on "after-the-
fact rationalizations," 93 did not make any showing that the three campaign
expenditure limits addressed any real harms in the Missouri electoral process.
Instead of requiring the State to make some showing of a "real harm"
under NTEU, the district court gave the State "the benefit of the doubt" and
assumed "that in fact the justifications offered [by counsel were] the reasons
for the passage of the laws. 94 Although the district court tested the statutes in
light of the harms "recited" by the State on cross motions for summary
judgment, it held that the three limits on candidates' spending were invalid
under Buckley.95 Limits on direct expenditures by candidates with their own
money were "clearly unconstitutional" under Buckley.96  Limits on
candidates' total campaign expenditures "clearly violate the rule of Buckley,
and cannot withstand strict scrutiny. ' 97 Missouri's spending limits "restrict
the quantity of political speech" and, like the spending limits held invalid in
Buckley, do not promote any state interest "in preventing quid pro quo
corruption." 8 Finally, the restrictions on the expenditure of carryover
campaign funds could not be justified under Buckley.99 The requirements that
candidates "spend down" their campaign funds rather than carrying them
forward for use in a subsequent election "limit political speech by telling a
candidate when he or she must speak," and they "do nothing to further the
goal of preventing corruption."100 The court of appeals affirmed the district
[this] burden.. ." Id.
91. Id. The State did not present any other evidence. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1249.
94. Id. at 1250; see id. at 1249 (State had not "provided any evidence that either the state
legislature or the electorate actually considered those justifications [advanced by the State at trial] in
enacting Senate Bill 650 or Proposition A.").
95. See id. at 1251-54. The court also held that a statute regulating candidates' campaign
advertisements violated the First Amendment. See id. at 1254-56. The State did not appeal this
judgment. See ShrinkI, 71 F.3d 1422, 1423 n.2 (8th Cir. 1995).
96. See Shrink I, 892 F. Supp. at 1251. The district court also found that Missouri had made "no
attempt to provide any justification" for"this direct limitation on a candidate's own political speech." Id.
97. Id. at 1253.
98. Id. at 1252. The district court held that the State's statutory scheme is "coercive because it
withdraws an important source of private campaign funding otherwise available to candidates." Id. It can
not be justified under "Buckley's rationale for upholding spending limits in retum for public financing"
because "Missouri provides no matching or public funds to any candidates." Id.
99. See id. at 1254.
100. Id. at 1254 (emphasis in original). Even if limiting the power of incumbency was a compelling
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court's judgment and its application of Buckley, and it did not discuss our
NTEU argument that the State must "demonstrate that the recited harms are
real."
10 1
2. Carver-Adoption
The NTEU argument that the district court cautiously skirted in Shrink I,
carried the day in Carver. The court of appeals adopted our argument that the
State has a duty to demonstrate that its campaign finance regulations address
real harms.'02 It found that the State had no evidence that the Proposition A
contribution limits addressed any "real" harm or disease. Although the court
of appeals noted the State's after-the-fact arguments at trial regarding the
harms allegedly caused by campaign contributions, 03 it expressly determined
that judicial deference to predictive judgments about harms would turn on the
evidence before the legislature or the electomte.1°  Moreover, the court
accepted our argument' 05 that laws, like Proposition A, adopted directly by
the electorate through initiatives or referenda were not entitled to the same
level of deference as legislative measures.1
06
The court of appeals recognized that "[t]he question [was] not simply that
of some limits or none at all' 1 7 on campaign contributions. Both Proposition
A and Senate Bill 650 limited campaign contributions,'0 8 but "Proposition A
limits [were] only ten to twenty percent of the higher limits in Senate Bill
650."'109 The narrow question was, then, whether lowering the contribution
limits set by Senate Bill 650 to the levels set by Proposition A addressed any
interest under Buckley, the district court found that the Missouri statute "is not narrowly tailored to serve
that interest." Id. The State's interest in "'equaliz[ing]' the spending power of the rich and poor" was not
compelling under Buckley. Id.
101. Shrink1, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995).
102. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 638 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting the NTEU test as set out in
the ACLU/EM amicus brief); see supra text accompanying notes 69-80.
103. In Shrink I, we argued that the State had a duty under NTEU to show that the legislature, or
the electorate, had considered real harms. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90. In Carver, we
suggested that the question whether the state could rely on "after-the-fact rationalizations" offered at
trial as evidence of these harms or whether there had to be some evidence that the legislature or the
electorate had considered these harms was moot. The district court had given the State an opportunity
at trial to make some showing that Proposition A's contribution limits addressed some "real harm,"
and the State had come up empty handed. See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern
Missouri as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 14-15 n.7, Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th
Cir. 1995) (No. 95-2608).
104. See Carver, 72 F.3d at 644.
105. See supra text at notes 74-76.
106. See Carver, 72 F.3d at 644-45.
107. Id. at642.
108. See supra text at notes 19-27.
109. Carver, 72 F.3d at 642 (footnote omitted).
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"real harm."'"0 The court of appeals, invoking the NTEU standard, found that
"[t]he record is barren of any evidence of a harm or disease that needed to be
addressed between the limits of Senate Bill 650 and those enacted in
Proposition A.""' The State had "no evidence as to why the Proposition A
limits of $100, $200, and $300 were selected;"'"12 it had "no evidence to
demonstrate that the limits were narrowly tailored to combat corruption or
the appearance of corruption associated with large campaign
contributions.""
3
Although the State had "no evidence" that contributions above
Proposition A's limits caused any "real harm," the State, ironically,
demonstrated that these contribution limits would have a substantial adverse
effect on candidates' ability to communicate their political views. Proposition
A's $100, $200, and $300 contribution limits per election cycle were
"dramatically lower than the $2000 limit per election cycle approved in
Buckley."' "14 Although the contribution limits approved in Buckley would
have barred only about 5.1% of the contributions made in the preceding 1974
election, the Proposition A limits would have effected "a much higher
percentage of contributors."'"15 Given "no evidence" that contributions in
excess of Proposition A's limits caused any "real harm" and the substantial
evidence of their adverse effects on political speech, the court of appeals
concluded that the State had not carried its burden of justification: "the State
has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Proposition A will
alleviate the harms in a direct and material way."
116
110. Id. ("The question is.. Proposition A [contribution limits] as compared to those in Senate
Bill 650, which was to become effective January 1, 1995.").
111. Id. at 643 (citing NTEU, 513 U.S. 454,474 (1995).
112. Carver, 72 F.3d at 642-43.
113. Id. at 643 (citation omitted). The court of appeals noted that "[the State presented testimony
at trial about a $420,000 contribution from a Morgan Stanley political action committee to various
races in north Missouri." Id. at 642. It concluded, however, that "[a] $42,000 contribution is a far cry
from the limits [$100 to $300] in Proposition A" and that the state's other examples "involve[d]
individual conduct leading to criminal prosecution." Id.
114. Id. at 641-42; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24 (1976) ($1000 limit "applies to aggregate
amounts contributed to the candidate for each election-with primaries, run-off elections, and general
elections counted separately."). The court of appeals noted the ACLUIEM's determination that "after
adjusting for inflation, Proposition A's $300 limit is 6 percent of the limit per election cycle
considered in Buckley, the $200 limit is 4 percent of the Buckley limit per election cycle, and the $100
limit is only 2 percent of the Buckley limit per election cycle." Carver, 72 F.3d at 642 n.8.
115. Carver, 72 F.3d at 643; see supra note 55. The "State's own evidence" showed that 19% to
35.6% of the contributors in various 1994 Missouri elections gave more than the amounts permitted by
Proposition A. See Carver, 72 F.3d at 643-44.
116. Carver, 72 F.3d at 644 (citation omitted); see id. ("The State made no showing as to why it
was necessary to adopt the lowest contribution limits in the nation and restrict the First Amendment
rights of so many contributors in order to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption associated
with large campaign contributions.").
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The court of appeals also rejected the State's contention that it should
defer to the voters' judgments about the harms in the political process to be
cured by contribution limits. 1 17 The Supreme Court in NTEU had adopted
verbatim Justice Kennedy's original statement of the "real harm" test in
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,'18 and it was true, as the State
argued, that Justice Kennedy had recognized that courts "must accord
substantial deference to the predictive judgments" of the legislature."19 The
court of appeals, however, refused to accord the "same deference to
Proposition A adopted through the initiative process by the citizens of
Missouri."'120 Deference "requires that courts ascertain that the legislative
body 'has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence."",
12
'
The voters, however, had no evidence, much less any substantial evidence, to
support their predictive judgments. 2 2 Moreover, the reasons for judicial
deference to "legislative enactments" do not apply to "proposals adopted byinitiative. ' 123
3. Shrink II-Application
Shortly after the court of appeals adopted the NTEU test in Carver, a
district court held that Missouri's limits on campaign contributions during
legislative sessions violated the First Amendment. In Shrink H,124 the court
insisted that the State must do more than posit the existence of some problem
or disease and must do more than recite some harm; the State must
demonstrate that the prohibited campaign contributions cause some "real
harm." The district court reviewed the State's after-the-fact evidence at trial,
117. See id. at 644.
118. 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994); see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
119. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 665 (1994); see Carver, 72 F.3d at 644.
120. Carver, 72 F.3d at 644.
121. Id. at 644 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 666).
122. The court of appeals found that "[t]here is simply no evidence in the record identifying the
source of Proposition A, whether it was an individual or a group, the process of its development, nor
the reasons for the particular dollar limits" and that "there is no evidence of the details of the campaign
waged in support of the initiative." Carver, 72 F.3d at 644.
123. Id. at 645. The court of appeals found:
Legislative bodies consist of elected representatives sworn to be bound by the United States
Constitution, and their legislative product is subject to veto by the elected executive, either
President or Governor. The process of enactment, while perhaps not always perfect, includes
deliberation and an opportunity for compromise and amendment, and usually committee studies
and hearings. These are substantial reasons for according deference to legislative enactments that
do not exist with respect to proposals adopted by initiative.
Id. at 644-45. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (additional reasons why popular measures
are entitled to less deference than legislative measures).
124. 922 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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and it also considered the evidence available to the legislature. Missouri,
however, simply had no evidence of any contributions, either to incumbents
or to challengers, during the regular legislative sessions that were actually
corrupt or that created the appearance of corruption.
In Senate Bill 650, the Missouri legislature prohibited statewide elected
officials, state senators, state representatives, and candidates for those offices
from accepting campaign contributions during any regular session of the
general assembly.1 5 The district court found that this "temporal ban on
contributions ... effectively eliminates a candidate's contributions intake for
four and one-half... months.' 26 Given this "severe impact" on political
association and communication, the State had to prove that the limit on
political contributions was "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest"! z7 Although Buckley held that avoiding corruption or the
appearance of corruption was a compelling interest, 28 the State had a duty
under NTEU to show some "real harm" that triggered this compelling
interest.1
29
Missouri, however, had no evidence that the acceptance of contributions
during the legislative sessions caused any "real harm." At the one day trial,
the State's attorneys had not presented any after-the-fact evidence of actual
corruption caused by political contributions made during a legislative session
or that such contributions created the appearance of corruption. 130 Although
"two witnesses testified in general terms of their belief that the public
perceives the acceptance of contributions during the legislative session as
'inappropriate,"' the State did not provide any "factual basis ... for these
witnesses' perception...."' 3 ' The State did not have any "examples or
incidents of actual corruption linked to such contributions nor incidents
wherein 'innocent' contributions were perceived by the public as being given
and accepted for a corruptive intent." 132 Newspaper articles about political
contributions "fail[ed] to demonstrate a pervasive problem with contributions
during the legislative session and the public's negative viewpoint of such
contributions."'
133
125. See supra text at note 28.
126. Shrinkll, 922 F. Supp. at 1418 (footnote omitted).
127. Id. at 1420.
128. See id.; seesupra text at note 51.
129. See Shrink 11, 922 F. Supp. at 1420 ("[t]he harm that the (state) seek[s] to eradicate must
exist"); see id. at 1421 (quoting the NTEU "real harm" test).
130. Seeid. at 1420-21.
131. Id.at 1421.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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More importantly, the legislature did not have any evidence that
contributions made during its sessions caused any "real harm." The district
court found that the State had not demonstrated that "any evidence was
presented to [a joint legislative campaign finance reform committee]
regarding actual corruption or the appearance of corruption and the
eradication of this harm by an in-session ban on campaign contributions.' 34
The court could not find any evidence that the legislature made "any attempt
.. to access and analyze the public's views on acceptance of contributions
during the general assembly's regular session."'35 In short, Missouri had
"wholly failed to establish a constitutional nexus between the interest they
[sought] to further, i.e. [prevention of] actual corruption or the appearance of
corruption, and the vast prohibition on acceptance of contributions during the
general assembly's regular session." 136 Given the absence of any evidence
that the prohibited contributions caused any "real harm," the State had "failed
to carry [its] burden of demonstrating that [the statute would] alleviate actual
corruption or the appearance of corruption in a direct and material way."'
37
III. LESSONS FOR WOULD-BE REFORMERS
Shrink I, Carver, and Shrink Il-the three Missouri campaign finance
cases-have established a new First Amendment requirement. In the Eighth
Circuit, campaign finance reformers will have to do more than recite a list of
harms in order to regulate political expenditures or contributions. Instead,
they must "demonstrate that the recited harms are real.' ' t38 This NTEU
standard protects political speech against legislation and initiatives that
merely pander to unproved specters of campaign ills, and it leaves
government free to address actual campaign finance problems. Although
courts and commentators have, as yet, taken little notice, the Supreme Court
in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission applied the same standard to a national campaign finance
regulation. 139 If, as many campaign finance reformers hope, the Court
reconsiders Buckley, the three Missouri cases and Colorado Republican
134. Id. at 1423; see id. ("no record of any [legislative] discussion or debate about a prevailing
problem with actual corruption or the appearance of corruption necessitating such a ban").
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1422.
137. Id at 1424. The court also held that the Missouri statute was "unconstitutionally vague." Id.
at 1424-25.
138. Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 638 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 457
(1995)).
139. 116 S. Ct 2309 (1996); see infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
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suggest strongly that any new restrictions on political speech must be
narrowly tailored responses, not to public clamoring, but to real harms.
A. The New First Amendment Hurdle
In its petitions for review in Shrink I and Carver, Missouri recognized
correctly that the Eighth Circuit had established a new standard for campaign
finance laws: the states must justify regulation of political speech, not on the
basis of public perceptions and fears, but instead on the basis of actual, real
world harms. 140 The State complained that the Eighth Circuit's adoption of
NTEU"impose[d] a substantial obstacle to campaign finance reform efforts"
because states would not be able to show that either the legislature or the
electorate had considered evidence of "real" campaign finance harms.'
41
Missouri, and most other states, would not be able to demonstrate real harm
because they do not make formal legislative history. 42 Moreover, if
"providing evidence to support an act of the state legislature may be difficult,
proving the 'initiative history' for measures adopted through the initiative
process is virtually impossible."'143 Missouri does, indeed, have reason to be
concerned about the need, not for any particular type of legislative history or
"initiative history," but for evidence that the legislature or the electorate
actually considered "real" campaign finance harms. Although the district
court in Shrink I expressly refused to impose this requirement, the court of
appeals in Carver and another district court in Shrink II considered the
question whether the legislature or the electorate had any evidence of actual
140. Missouri sought review in Shrink I in part on the ground that the court of appeals had adopted
a new "evidentiary requirement." Petition For Writ Of Certiorari at 26-29, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1524); see Reply In Support Of Petition For
Writ Of Certiorari at 4-5, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995)
(No. 95-1524) (complaining about the "Eighth Circuit's decision to demand some unspecified kind of
additional evidence"). Similarly, the State sought review in Carver in part on the ground that the
Eighth Circuit had imposed "an evidentiary requirement that is entirely absent from Buckley." Petition
For Writ Of Certiorari, Nixon v. Carver, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1258); see id. at 25-26;
see also Brief of the States of Kentucky As Amici Curiae On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari at 20,
Nixon v. Carver, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1258) (amicus brief for nine states and two cities
arguing that, contrary to Buckley, the Eighth Circuit had imposed a "burden upon the State or local
government to prove why it selected a particular contribution limit lower than other available
alternatives.").
141. Petition For Writ Of Certiorari at 25, Nixon v. Carver, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-
1258).
142. Petition For Writ Of Certiorari at 27-28, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 71
F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1524).
143. Id. at 28. Missouri noted that, under state statutes and case law, the text of an initiative does
not identify its purpose, and that "nothing in the formal initiative process creates a record of the
findings or goals of either the proponents or circulators of the measure, or of the citizens who vote for
its passage." Id.
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harm, as well as after-the-fact rationalizations offered by the state's counsel
at trial. 144
Regardless whether the court of appeals ultimately requires the State to
demonstrate that the legislature or the electorate had some evidence of real
harm or permits the State, through counsel at trial, to build an after-the-fact
case that campaign finance regulations address a real harm, it has established
an important new First Amendment bulwark for political speech and
association. The State's failure to demonstrate that Proposition A's
contribution limits addressed any "real harm" proved fatal in Carver.
Similarly, the State's failure to demonstrate that the acceptance of
contributions during legislative sessions caused any "real harm" proved fatal
in Shrink II.
To say that the Missouri legislature in Senate Bill 650 and voters in
Proposition A had no evidence of any harm caused by the campaign practices
that they prohibited is not to deny that some practices may be harmful; that
the harm might be identified; and that narrowly tailored regulations might be
devised. If, for example, campaign contributions during legislative sessions
cause some "real harm," then surely it is not too much to require the state to
make the type of showing that the district court found wanting in Shrink H.'45
If, however, the State can make no showing that such contributions cause any
"real harm," then it is hard to understand how the State could have any
interest, compelling or otherwise, in prohibiting them. Absent some evidence
of "real harm," would-be campaign finance reformers should address public
perceptions of corruption or other harms with narrowly tailored regulations,
like disclosure provisions, that respect our nation's commitment, under the
First Amendment, to open, robust political debate.
146
B. Buckley-Which Way Will The Tree Fall?
Although the ACLU/EM successfully supplemented Buckley's First
Amendment protection of political speech with the NTEU requirement that
states must "demonstrate" that campaign finance regulations alleviate "real
harms," others are busy laying the groundwork to expand governmental
144. Compare supra text at notes 88-90 with text at notes 102-04, 124-36.
145. See supra text at notes 130-37. A recent Arkansas district court decision suggests the ways in
which a state might satisfy the Eight Circuit's "real harm" standard. See Russell v. Burris, 978 F.
Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (upholding a $I00 per election contribution limit for certain non-
statewide elections on grounds that the State had "substantial evidence" of the need for this limit).
146. The Missouri legislature amended the State's campaign finance disclosure requirement in
1997 and established an electronic reporting system. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 130.046, 130.057 (West
Supp. 1998).
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regulation of political speech. The Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law, to take but one prominent example, is now
waging a "full-court press" to force the Supreme Court to overrule Buckley's
First Amendment protection of candidates' political expenditures. 147 Of
course, given broad agreement that Buckley's distinction between
contributions and expenditures is false and that both contributions and
expenditures are political speech,14 8 there is some risk that the Court might
instead overrule Buckley's approval of Congress' power to regulate
contributions. It is, in short, not clear which way the tree will fall-
governmental power to regulate "both contributions and expenditures-or
neither."'
149
Fortunately, there are strong reasons to believe that the tree will fall on
the First Amendment side of protecting both political contributions and
political expenditures. Indeed, although some courts continue to assess
campaign finance regulations exclusively under the Buckley framework, 50 a
few other courts have now followed the Eighth Circuit's lead and have
augmented First Amendment protection of both political expenditures and
contributions. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, for
example, held that regulation of political contributions requires "evidence" of
harm.151 In a similar vein, the Oregon Supreme Court held that $100 and
147. See, e.g., Rosenkranz, Campaign Reform: The Hidden Killers, THE NATION, May 5, 1997, at
5; Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, A Full-Court Press On Campaign Cash, NAT'L J., Dec. 7,
1996, at 2656.
148. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 116 S. Ct.
2309, 2325-28 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) ("[a]
contribution is simply an indirect expenditure; though contributions and expenditures may thus differ
in form, they do not differ in substance"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 241-42 (1976) (per curiam)
(Burger, C.J.) ("contributions and expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment coin");
Lillian I BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance
Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1062-65 (1985).
149. See Germond & Witcover, supra note 147.
150. See e.g., Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 648-51 (6th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 162 (1997) (upholding campaign contribution limits under Buckley without
addressing the question whether the State had any evidence that contributions in excess of the
prohibited amounts caused any real harm).
151. SeeBlountv. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1351 (1996)
(recognizing government's duty to demonstrate that "the ills it claims the rule addresses in fact exist
and the rule will materially reduce them" (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664
(1994)) and finding that the particular harm, conflict of interest, was self-evident). The District Court
for the District of Columbia subsequently held that $50 and $100 campaign contribution limits
violated the First Amendment. National Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 924 F. Supp. 270
(D.D.C. 1996), vacated and remanded, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1997). There was no evidence to
support these contribution limits, and the court, following Carver, expressly refused to defer to the
predictive judgments of the legislature, which had not considered any "solid evidence" about the need
for and the potential effects of the $50 and $100 contribution limits. See id. at 281-82, 285. The court
of appeals found that the enactment of legislation increasing the contribution limits mooted the case,
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$500 contribution limits were invalid under the state constitution in part on
the ground that the state had no evidence that campaign contributions caused
corruption. 152
Most importantly, the Supreme Court, albeit with little fanfare, has
adopted the same evidentiary requirement for campaign finance regulations
as the Eighth Circuit. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
v. Federal Election Commission, the Court followed Buckley and held that
limits on "independent" expenditures by political parties in national elections
violate the First Amendment153 The Court, however, did more than simply
reaffirm and apply Buckley's First Amendment standard; it imposed a duty
on the government to demonstrate that independent expenditures by political
parties caused some harm or problem. 154 The Court found that neither
Congress, nor the government's lawyers at trial, had any evidence that
and it vacated the district court's judgment. See 108 F.3d at 348, 354.
The CarverINTEU requirement of "real harm" will be raised to challenge both Alaska and
Colorado campaign finance regulations. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, No. 3AN-97-CI
(Superior Court, 3d Judicial District); Durham v. Colorado (D. Colo.), No. 96-WY-2973).
152. See Vanatta v. Kiesling, 931 P.2d 770, 785-87 (Or. 1997).
153. See 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996). An expenditure made by a political party and that is not
coordinated with a candidate is an "independent" expenditure. See id. at 2313. Seven members of the
Court, in three opinions, supported the Court's judgment that limits on a political party's
"independent" expenditures violated the First Amendment. Justice Breyer announced the judgment of
the Court and delivered an opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter, that limits on
"independent" expenditures violate the First Amendment. Four other members of the Court would
have held that limits on both "independent" and "coordinated" expenditures violate the First
Amendment. Justice Kennedy, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, supported this broader
holding. See id. at 2321 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part). Justice Thomas, also joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, supported this
broader holding. See id. at 2323 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part).
154. In two of the three opinions supporting the Court's judgment (see supra note 153), six
members of the Court expressly adopted Justice Kennedy's statement for a plurality in Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC of the government's duty to demonstrate that regulations of speech
address a real harm. 116 S. Ct. at 2317 (Breyer, J., O'Connor, & Souter, JJ.) (citing Turner Broad
Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 661-63 (Kennedy, J.)), see Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2331 (Thomas, J.,
Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (citing Turner Broad.
S's., Inc., 512 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy J.)). Although Justice Kennedy did not cite his Turner
Broadcasting System test in his Colorado Republican opinion, there is no reason to believe that he
would object to the application of his test to campaign finance regulations. See Colorado Republican,
116 S. Ct. at 2322-23 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part). There would seem to be only two members of the Court who disagree with the
imposition of a duty on the government to demonstrate that campaign finance regulations address a
real problem. See idt at 2332 (Stevens, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (urging "special deference to [Congress']
judgment on questions related to the extent and nature of limits on campaign spending."); see also id.
at 2329 n.9 (Thomas, J.) (rejecting deference to Congress as amounting to "letting the fox stand watch
over the henhouse."). In NTEU, a majority of the Court adopted the test stated by Justice Kennedy for
a plurality in Turner Broadcasting System, and the courts in the Eighth Circuit subsequently invoked
the NTEU statement of the government's duty to show some "real harm." See supra notes 88, 102 &
129 and accompanying text.
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independent expenditures by political parties caused any problem of
corruption. 55 This evidentiary requirement, largely ignored by most lower
courts and commentators, 156 might well be read as implicitly overruling
Buckley's approval of Congress' power to regulate contributions on the basis
of speculation about corruption or the appearance of corruption. 57 Even if it
is premature to conclude that the Buckley tree has already fallen on the First
Amendment side, Colorado Republican confirms the Eighth Circuit's
decision to supplement Buckley's First Amendment standards and to require
that restrictions on political speech are a response to real problems, not
merely to public passions.1
58
155. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2317 (Breyer, 3., O'Connor, & Souter, JJ.) (noting
that "[tihe Government does not point to record evidence or legislative findings suggesting any special
corruption problem in respect to independent party expenditures"); see id. at 2331 (Thomas, J.,
Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (noting that "[tihe
Government... has identified no more proof of the corrupting dangers of coordinated expenditures
than it has of independent expenditures").
156. The lower courts, with only one exception, have not yet recognized that Colorado
Republican imposes a duty on the states and the national government to demonstrate that campaign
finance regulations address a real problem. See American Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer, 120
F.3d 1092, 1105 (10th Cir. 1997) (state disclosure provisions not necessary to address any problem of
fraud because state had not made any showing that existing regulations did not adequately cure this
problem).
157. See supra text at notes 49-55.
158. The Court, albeit in the context of the Fourth Amendment, has recently reaffirmed the
requirement that government must act on the basis of real, not hypothetical, problems. See Chandler v.
Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1303 (1997) (holding that compulsory drug testing of candidates for certain
state offices violated the Fourth Amendment where "[n]othing in the record hints that the hazards [the
state] broadly describe[s] are real and not simply hypothetical.'); see also Glickman v. Wileman Bros.
& Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2150 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (under Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc., 512 U.S. at 664, the government has an "obligation to establish the empirical reality of
the problems it purports to be addressing" in order to justify an underinclusive regulation of
commercial speech); cf Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 1372 (1997)
(noting that "elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted justifications"
is not required where an election law does not impose severe burdens on associational interests).
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